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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this grand jury proceeding, the issue on appeal is 
whether, on the facts presented, the crime-fraud exception 
overrides the attorney-client privilege. In the proceedings 
below, the District Court declined to enforce a grand jury 
subpoena issued to an attorney. Citing the crime-fraud 
exception, the government has appealed.1 
 
I. 
 
Over four years ago in April 1996, a federal grand jury 
commenced investigating the target's business transactions 
and issued several subpoenas to the target's affiliated 
businesses. The target's attorney assumed responsibility in 
responding to the United States Attorney's office. The 
government's first subpoena sought, 
 
       all records . . . relating to work performed [by the 
       target] . . . . These records should include but are not 
       limited to: All business checks, check registers, cash 
       receipt and disbursement records. These records 
       should also include contracts, invoices, billing 
       documents, bid documents and correspondence 
       specifically relating to [the target's activities] for the 
       [relevant] period. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In order to preserve the confidentiality of the proceedings, we will 
refer 
to the dramatis personae as the target (the target of the investigation) 
and the attorney (the target's attor ney who is the witness under 
subpoena). 
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The attorney produced several documents. But believing 
them inadequate, the government requested fuller 
document production. The attorney r esponded that certain 
categories of requested documents did not exist. 
 
In May 1996, the government again requested the 
documents under its initial subpoena and advised the 
attorney that "the grand jury will also r equest that the 
target appear before it with regar d to the production of the 
documents in question." The attorney pr ovided some 
additional documents including check ledgers and canceled 
checks. The target was not summoned to appear before the 
grand jury. 
 
In September 1996, the government issued a second 
subpoena requesting additional documents including: 
general ledgers, cash disbursement journals, cash receipts, 
sales and accounts payable journals, as well as calenders, 
diaries and appointment books for all of the tar get's 
business officers and employees. The attor ney again 
responded that most of the requested documents did not 
exist. On January 10, 1997 the government advised the 
attorney that it was subpoenaing "the custodian of records 
[of one of] the target business[es] to produce all responsive 
original records before the Grand Jury next Thursday 
[January 16]." The government also subpoenaed an officer 
of the target business to testify befor e the grand jury (also 
on January 16) about her knowledge of the existence of the 
subpoenaed documents. The government never enforced its 
subpoenas. 
 
In April 1997, November 1998, and March 1999 the 
government subpoenaed more recor ds from the target 
business. The attorney produced some of the requested 
documents but again represented that certain categories of 
documents did not exist. On March 8, 1999, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation executed search warrants on the 
target's home and also on the target's business offices. The 
FBI uncovered and seized many recor ds and documents the 
attorney had represented did not exist. On April 30, 1999, 
the government subpoenaed the attorney to testify before 
the grand jury about the "source[s] of information for [his] 
. . . factual assertions . . . and basis for failing to produces 
[sic] certain categories of recor ds." 
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After the attorney invoked the attorney-client privilege, 
the government filed a motion to compel his testimony. 
Claiming the crime-fraud exception invalidated the 
attorney-client privilege, the government argued the target 
used the attorney to obstruct justice in violation of 18 
U.S.C. S 1503.2 Holding it was "fundamentally unfair" to 
compel the attorney's testimony, the District Court declined 
to assess the applicability of the crime-fraud exception. In 
the Matter of the Grand Jury Empaneled on December 4, 
1997, Misc. No. 97-389, slip op. at *8 (D. N.J. February 8, 
2000). 
 
The government appeals contending the District Court 
erred in failing to decide whether the crime-fraud exception 
applied. It also contends the District Court exceeded its 
authority in quashing the subpoena because of 
"fundamental unfairness."  
 
II. 
 
We review the decision to quash a grand jury subpoena 
for abuse of discretion. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 115 
F.3d 1240, 1243 (5th Cir. 1997). W e exercise de novo review 
over the legal issues underlying the application of the 
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. 
United States v. Inigo, 925 F.2d 641, 656 (3d Cir. 1991). We 
review the District Court's factual deter minations in 
applying the attorney-client privilege for clear error. Id. 
 
III. 
 
The grand jury plays a unique role in our adversarial 
system. The Supreme Court has recognized"the whole 
theory of its function is that it belongs to no branch of the 
institutional Government, serving as a kind of buffer or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. 18 U.S.C. S 1503 provides: 
 
       Whoever corruptly, or by threats or for ce, or by any threatening 
       letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or 
       impede any grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of 
the 
       United States, . . . or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede 
the 
       due administration of justice, shall be punished . .. . 
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referee between the Government and the people." United 
States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992). It has stated, 
 
       Although the grand jury normally operates, of course, 
       in the courthouse and under judicial auspices, its 
       institutional relationship with the Judicial Branch has 
       traditionally been, so to speak, at arm's length. Judges' 
       direct involvement in the functioning of the grand jury 
       has generally be confined to the constitutive one of 
       calling the grand jurors together and administering 
       their oaths of office. 
 
Id. 
 
Several cases have recognized the judiciary's limited 
authority over the grand jury's subpoena and indictment 
power. See Williams, 504 U.S. at 54-55 (court can not 
exercise it's supervisory power to requir e prosecutors to 
present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury); Costello v. 
United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1956) (court may not 
exercise its supervisory power to mandate a rule permitting 
defendants to challenge grand jury indictments because of 
inadequate or incompetent evidence). As we r ecently stated 
in In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 
 
       Because it is essential to the federal criminal justice 
       system, [the grand jury] . . . has great powers of 
       investigation and inquisition. [It] . . . may generally 
       `compel the production of evidence or the testimony of 
       witnesses as it considers appropriate, and its operation 
       generally is unrestrained by the technical pr ocedural 
       and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal 
       trials.' 
 
223 F.3d 213, 216 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974)). 
 
"Any holding that would saddle a grand jury with minitrials 
and preliminary showings would assuredly impede its 
investigation and frustrate the public's inter est in the fair 
and expeditious administration of the criminal laws." United 
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). 
 
As the Supreme Court has made clear,"the government 
cannot be required to justify the issuance of a grand jury 
subpoena . . . because the very purpose of r equesting the 
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information is to ascertain whether pr obable cause exists." 
United States v. R. Enter., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991) 
(citing Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 65 (1906)). "Requiring 
the Government to explain in too much detail the particular 
reasons underlying a subpoena threatens to compromise 
`the indispensable secrecy of the grand jury proceedings.' " 
Id. at 299 (quoting United States v. Johnson , 319 U.S. 503, 
513 (1943)). 
 
Despite these broad investigatory powers, ther e are some 
limitations on the grand jury's authority to subpoena 
evidence. See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 346 (the grand jury 
"may not itself violate a valid privilege, whether established 
by the Constitution, statutes, or the common law"); 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) ("the powers 
of the grand jury are not unlimited and ar e subject to the 
supervision of a judge"); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 
441, 453-54 (1971) (holding grand jury may override a Fifth 
Amendment claim only if the witness is granted immunity 
co-extensive with the privilege against self-incrimination). 
The Supreme Court has stated, "grand juries are not 
licensed to engage in arbitrary fishing expeditions, nor may 
they select targets of investigation out of malice or an intent 
to harass." R. Enter., Inc., 498 U.S. at 299. 
 
As a safeguard against potential abuse of the grand jury's 
broad investigative power, the Federal Rules of Evidence 
and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedur e grant limited 
authority for courts to review grand jury subpoenas. In this 
case, the two principal mechanisms for judicial r eview are 
Fed. R. Evid. 501,3 recognizing the attorney-client privilege 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Fed R. Evid. 501 provides: 
 
       Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United 
       States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the 
       Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a 
       witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision 
thereof 
       shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may 
       be interpreted by the courts of the United States in light of 
reason 
       and experience. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(2) provides that the rules on privileges 
articulated by Fed. R. of Evid. 501 are applicable to grand jury 
proceedings. The government here does not contest the attorney's right 
to assert the attorney-client privilege. 
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which protects confidential communications between an 
attorney and his client from disclosur e, and Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 17(c), providing that "[t]he court on motion made 
promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance 
would be unreasonable or oppressive." 
 
IV. 
 
The District Court did not refer to Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c) 
nor to the attorney-client privilege when it declined to 
compel the attorney's testimony. It stated, 
 
       The Court will assume for purposes of its analysis that 
       [the attorney] is innocent of any wr ongdoing and has 
       been used merely as a conduit for wrongdoing, i.e., the 
       obstruction of justice. Nevertheless it is fundamentally 
       unfair for the U.S. Attorney's Office to seek [the 
       attorney's] testimony in this case.  
 
In the Matter of the Grand Jury Empaneled on December 4, 
1997, at *8. 
 
Reasoning that to obtain the desired infor mation, the 
government could have pursued avenues less har mful to 
the attorney-client privilege, including enfor cing its 
subpoenas on the target and the recor ds custodian, the 
District Court stated, 
 
       The award for neither appointing nor insisting upon a 
       custodian of records cannot be securing the testimony 
       of the subject's attorney. Instead the U.S. Attorney's 
       Office should have acted upon the subpoenas it 
       procured and not assume that it could fall back on the 
       subject's attorney. 
 
Id. at *9. 
 
Compelling the lawyer's testimony, the court said,"goes 
against the core of the adversarial system and would 
unnecessarily `drive a wedge' between a client and his 
attorney, thereby `chilling' communications."4 Id. at *10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In discussing the impact of this subpoena on criminal practice, the 
District Court stated it is common for criminal defense attorneys and the 
government to informally negotiate the production of materials for grand 
jury investigations. By forcing attorneys to testify against their 
clients, 
the court feared many criminal defense attor neys would be "unwilling to 
informally satisfy the subpoena for fear of the consequences." In the 
Matter of the Grand Jury Empaneled on December 4, 1997, at *10. 
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(citing Loatman v. Summit Bank, 174 F .R.D. 592, 605 (D. 
N.J. 1997)). 
 
V. 
 
Because the District Court relied on neither Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 17 nor an analysis of the crime-fraud exception, the 
government contends the Court exceeded its authority in 
quashing the subpoena. 
 
A. 
 
In R. Enter., Inc., 498 U.S. at 299, the Supreme Court 
discussed the court's limited role in r egulating grand jury 
subpoenas. A grand jury target sought to quash a 
government subpoena on the grounds of r elevancy. The 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held the 
government must establish the relevancy and admissibility 
of the evidence subpoenaed. The Supreme Court r eversed 
holding the Court of Appeals improperly placed the burden 
on the government to prove relevancy. Citing the grand 
jury's historical independence from the judiciary, the Court 
said a grand jury subpoena is presumed r easonable unless 
its recipient demonstrates otherwise. Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c) 
permits judicial oversight only when "compliance would be 
unreasonable or oppressive." 498 U.S. at 298-99. Thus, the 
Court held trial courts can not place an initial bur den on 
the government to prove a grand jury subpoena is 
necessary and relevant. 
 
Similarly, in Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme 
Ct. of Pennsylvania, 975 F.2d 102 (3d Cir . 1992), cert. 
denied, 507 U.S. 984 (1993), we held a Pennsylvania Rule 
of Professional Conduct governing grand jury subpoena 
procedures was unenforceable because it interfered with 
the grand jury's institutional independence. The Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania had adopted a Rule of Pr ofessional 
Conduct which provided: 
 
       A public prosecutor or other governmental lawyer shall 
       not, without prior judicial approval, subpoena an 
       attorney to appear before a grand jury or other tribunal 
       investigating criminal activity in circumstances where 
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       the prosecutor or other governmental lawyer seeks to 
       compel the attorney/witness to provide evidence 
       concerning a person who is or has been r epresented by 
       the attorney witness. (Citation omitted). 
 
       Comment 
 
       It is intended that the required `prior judicial approval' 
       will normally be withheld unless, after a hearing 
       conducted with due regard for the appr opriate need for 
       secrecy, the court finds (1) the infor mation sought is 
       not protected from disclosure by Rule 1.6 [concerning 
       confidentiality of information], the attorney-client 
       privilege or the work product doctrine; (2) the evidence 
       sought is relevant to the proceeding; (3) compliance 
       with the subpoena would not be unreasonable or 
       oppressive; (4) the purpose of the subpoena is not 
       primarily to harass the attorney/witness or his or her 
       client; and (5) there is no other feasible alternative to 
       obtain the information sought. 
 
Id. at 104 (quoting Rule 3.10 of the Pennsylvania Rules of 
Professional Conduct). 
 
The pre-service judicial review mandated by the 
Pennsylvania rule, we held, exceeded the district court's 
authority to intervene in grand jury proceedings. Noting the 
Supreme Court's reluctance to place judicial restraints on 
the grand jury, see id. at 106-08, and the grand jury's 
historically recognized independence, we held"the district 
court may not under the guise of its supervisory power or 
its local rule-making power, impose the sort of substantive 
restraint on the grand jury that is contemplated by Rule 
3.10." Id. at 110. We also held the Pennsylvania Rule could 
not be justified under Fed. R. Crim. P. 17 reasoning that 
neither 
 
       Rule 17 nor any other provision in the federal rules or 
       statutes allows for judicial intervention befor e a 
       subpoena is served. Instead subdivision (c) pr ovides 
       that a party may move to quash a subpoena on the 
       grounds that compliance would be unreasonable or 
       oppressive only after it has been served. 
 
Id. at 108. 
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B. 
 
It is well established that courts may not impose 
substantive limitations on the power of the grand jury to 
issue subpoenas nor place the initial burden on the 
government to prove the validity of its subpoenas. See 
Baylson, 975 F.2d at 106-08. In W illiams, the Supreme 
Court stated, 
 
       Any power federal courts have to fashion, on their own 
       initiative, rules of grand jury procedur e is a very 
       limited one, not remotely comparable to the power they 
       maintain over their own proceedings. It certainly would 
       not permit judicial reshaping of the grand jury 
       institution, substantially altering the traditional 
       relationships between the prosecution, the constituting 
       court, and the grand jury itself. (citation omitted). 
 
504 U.S. at 50. 
 
Similarly in Costello, the Court stated,"it would run 
counter to the whole history of the grand jury institution, in 
which laymen conduct their inquiries unfetter ed by 
technical rules" to permit federal courts to establish 
independent rules governing the enforcement of grand jury 
subpoenas. 350 U.S. at 364. 
 
One form of restraint, however, may be found in Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 17(c). But as noted, the District Court never 
applied Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c). Instead, it held that the 
government must demonstrate the evidence sought could 
not be obtained by other means. The District Court's 
prescribed course of action may be salutary and efficacious 
to safeguard the attorney-client privilege. Under appropriate 
circumstances, it may well constitute the better practice. 
But we see no authority for it in the rules or the case law. 
See R. Enter., Inc., 498 U.S. at 298-99. Generally, the 
government does not bear the initial bur den to justify its 
grand jury subpoena. See id.; see also Stern v. United 
States Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Massachusetts, 214 F.3d 4, 
16 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding local rule which permitted 
judicial approval of subpoena "alter[ed] the grand jury's 
historic role, place[d] it under overly intrusive court 
supervision, curb[ed] its broad investigative powers, 
reverse[d] the presumption of validity accorded to its 
 
                                10 
  
subpoenas, undermine[d] the secr ecy of its proceedings, 
and create[d] procedural detours and delays"). 
 
The institutional independence and secrecy of the grand 
jury has been a hallmark of criminal indictments for over 
three centuries. Any deviation from the established 
practices governing court involvement should not be taken 
lightly. We recognize the District Court was concerned with 
the effect of this subpoena on the attor ney-client 
relationship. But the proper course under Fed. R. Crim. P. 
17(c) was to rule on whether the lawyer's testimony was 
protected under the attorney-client privilege. By employing 
"a different analysis" based on"fundamental fairness" the 
District Court deviated from the established pr ocedures 
which ensure the institutional independence of the grand 
jury.5 Therefore, the District Court abused its discretion. 
 
VI. 
 
We now turn to whether the District Court erred in its 
application of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney- 
client privilege. "Worthy of maximum pr otection," Haines v. 
Ligget Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1992), the 
attorney-client privilege is one of the "oldest of the 
privileges for confidential communications known." Upjohn 
Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). As noted by 
the Supreme Court, "courts have long viewed[the 
privilege's] . . . central concern as one to `encourage full 
and frank communication between attorneys and their 
clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the 
observance of law and administration of justice.' " United 
States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989) (quoting Upjohn, 
449 U.S. at 389).6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. It bears noting that the United States Attor ney Manual provides, 
"Approval [of the Assistant Attor ney General for the Criminal Division] 
is 
required to issue [a] grand jury or trial subpoena to attorneys for 
information relating to the representation of [a] client." U.S. Atty's. 
Man. 
9-13.410. 
 
6. Communications are protected under the attorney-client privilege 
when: 
 
       (1) legal advice of any kind is sought (2) fr om a professional 
legal 
       advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to 
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The grand jury may not "itself violate a valid privilege, 
whether established by the Constitution, statutes, or the 
common Law." Calandra, 414 U.S. at 346. For this reason, 
courts may quash an otherwise valid grand jury subpoena 
for an attorney's testimony under the attor ney-client 
privilege. Fed. R. Evid. 501. When legal advice is sought in 
furtherance of a crime or fraud, however, the attorney-client 
privilege is waived and a grand jury may compel a lawyer's 
testimony. See, e.g., Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 
(1933) ("A client who consults an attorney for advice that 
will serve him in the commission of a fraud will have no 
help from the law. He must let the truth be told."); Inigo, 
925 F.2d at 656 ("when legal consultation is in furtherance 
of a crime or fraud, the statements . . . will not be 
protected."). We have described the crime-fraud exception in 
this manner: 
 
       The attorney-client privilege is designed to encourage 
       clients to make full disclosure of facts to counsel so 
       that he may properly, competently, and ethically carry 
       out his representation. The ultimate aim is to promote 
       the proper administration of justice. That end, 
       however, would be frustrated if the client used the 
       lawyer's services to further a continuing or futur e 
       crime or tort. Thus, when the lawyer is consulted, not 
       with respect to past wrongdoing but to future illegal 
       activities, the privilege is no longer defensible and the 
       crime-fraud exception comes into play. 
 
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir. 
1979) (citations omitted). 
 
A party seeking to compel testimony under the crime- 
fraud exception bears the initial burden of pr oving a prima 
facie case of a crime or fraud before the attor ney-client 
privilege is waived.7 Haines , 975 F.2d at 95-96 ("[T]he party 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       that purpose, (4) made in confidence, (5) by the client, (6) are at 
his 
       insistence permanently protected (7) fr om disclosure by himself or 
       by the legal advisor, (8) except the pr otection [may] be waived. 
 
In the Matter of the Grand Jury Empaneled on February 14, 1978, 603 
F.2d 469, 474 (3d Cir. 1979) (citations omitted). 
 
7. In Clark, 289 U.S. at 14-15, the Supr eme Court described the 
evidentiary standard for the application of the crime fraud exception: 
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seeking discovery must present evidence which, if believed 
by the fact-finder, would be sufficient to support a finding 
that the elements of the crime-fraud exception wer e met."); 
Feldberg v. Walters, 862 F.2d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[A] 
prima facie case must be defined with regar d to its 
function: to require the adverse party, the one with superior 
access to the evidence and in the best position to explain 
things, to come forward with that explanation."). Here, the 
government asserts the target business obstructed justice 
by failing to disclose documents subpoenaed by the grand 
jury.8 The government maintains it has submitted sufficient 
prima facie evidence of obstruction of justice to show the 
existence of a crime, in the form of documents found 
during the FBI's search of the target business' offices, as 
well as from ex parte, in camera affidavits. Challenging this 
assessment, the attorney contends the gover nment 
presented insufficient evidence that the tar get and the 
target business corruptly intended to obstruct justice. 
 
The District Court declined to decide whether the 
government submitted sufficient prima facie evidence of 
intent to obstruct justice. Although it corr ectly outlined the 
law, the Court stated, 
 
       Typically, at this point in the Opinion, the Court would 
       begin to analyze whether the Government has 
       articulated a prima facie showing of a fraud or a crime 
       pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 1503(a) by first examining 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       There must be a showing of a prima facie case sufficient to satisfy 
       the judge that the light should be let in . . . T o drive the 
[attorney 
       client] privilege away, there must be `something to give colour to 
the 
       charge;' there must be `prima facie evidence that it has some 
       foundation in fact.' When the evidence is supplied, the seal of 
       secrecy is broken. (citations and footnote omitted). 
 
8. The elements of a prima facie case of obstruction of justice under 18 
U.S.C. S1503 are: (1) the existence of a judicial proceeding; (2) 
knowledge 
or notice of the pending proceeding; (3) acting corruptly with the intent 
of influencing, obstructing, or impeding the pr oceeding in the due 
administration of justice; and (4) the action had the "natural and 
probable effect" of interfering with the due administration of justice. 
See 
United States v. Collis, 128 F.3d 313, 318 (6th Cir. 1997). 
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       whether there is evidence of criminal intent. This court 
       finds, however, that the unique cir cumstances 
       surrounding this case warrant a differ ent analysis than 
       that articulated by the parties. 
 
In the Matter of the Grand Jury Empaneled on December 4, 
1997, at *8. 
 
We believe this was error. See, e.g., Clark, 289 U.S. at 15; 
Haines, 975 F.2d at 90; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 
F.2d at 802. The proper course would have been to 
determine the applicability of the crime-fraud exception to 
the attorney-client privilege. If the gover nment has 
submitted sufficient prima facie evidence of a crime or 
fraud and legal advice was sought from or given by the 
attorney in connection therewith,9 the attorney-client 
privilege has been waived, and the grand jury may compel 
the attorney to testify about his communications with the 
target. See, e.g., In re Impounded Case (Law Firm), 879 F.2d 
1211, 1213-14 (3d Cir. 1989); In Re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 223 F.3d at 218-19, we held it is not 
"violative of due process to rely on an ex parte government affidavit to 
determine that the crime-fraud exception applies and thus compel a 
target-client's subpoenaed attorney to testify before the grand jury." Id. 
at 219. Because the need for secrecy in grand jury proceedings prohibits 
an adversarial proceeding regarding ex parte, in camera evidence, courts 
may rely exclusively on ex parte materials infinding sufficient prima 
facie evidence to invoke the crime-fraud exception and "we must rely on 
the district court's discretion and appellate r eview of the exercise of 
that 
discretion to ensure that the power of the grand jury is not abused while 
preserving the secrecy that is a necessary element of the grand jury 
process." Id. Where there are no secrecy or confidentialityimperatives, 
however, there would seem to be no impediment to permitting the 
attorney to challenge the government's prima facie evidence, subject also 
to the Supreme Court's admonition to avoid"minitrials." See Dionisio, 
410 U.S. at 17; but see Laser Industries, Ltd. v. Reliant Tech., Inc., 167 
F.R.D. 417, 420 (N.D. Cal. 1996). In the civil context, we have permitted 
this. See Haines, 975 F.2d at 96 ("fundamental concepts of due process 
require that the party defending the privilege be given the opportunity to 
be heard, by evidence and argument, at the hearing seeking an exception 
to the privilege."); see also Feldberg, 862 F.2d at 626 (after prima facie 
showing that exception applies, party asserting privilege should have 
opportunity to rebut, "if the court finds the explanation satisfactory, 
the 
privilege remains."). 
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395, 399-401 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Absent thisfinding, the 
attorney may validly assert the attorney-client privilege in 
response to the grand jury subpoena. See In Re Grand Jury 
Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 384 (3d. Cir . 1990) (a party 
may invoke a historically recognized privilege to protect 
communications from disclosure to the grand jury). For 
these reasons, the District Court must decide whether the 
government has submitted sufficient evidence of the intent 
to obstruct justice and determine whether this evidence 
supports a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Once the 
court determines there is sufficient evidence of a crime or 
fraud to waive the attorney-client privilege, we review its 
judgment for abuse of discretion. In r e Grand Jury 
Subpoena, 223 F.3d at 219; In r e Grand Jury Subpoenas, 
144 F.3d 653, 663 (10th Cir. 1998) ("we find no abuse [of 
discretion] in either the district court's r efusal to conduct a 
separate rebuttal hearing or its refusal to reveal the 
contents of the government's submission"). 
 
VII. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate and remand for 
findings under Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c) and the crime fraud 
exception to the attorney-client privilege. 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, dissenting : 
 
Because I disagree with the Majority's conclusion that 
"the District Court never applied Fed. R. Crim. P . 17(c) [and 
instead] held that the government must demonstrate the 
evidence sought could not be obtained by other means," I 
respectfully dissent. Majority Opinion at 10. I believe that 
the District Court validly exercised its discr etion under Rule 
17(c) and did not impose a broad "no-alternative-means" 
test. Therefore, I would affirm. 
 
The Government claims that the District Court applied a 
broad-reaching "no-alternative-means test" to determine 
whether the attorney's subpoena was fair and therefore 
enforceable. Appellant's brief at 39. Appar ently, the 
Majority agrees.1 It holds that the court employed an 
analysis "based on `fundamental fairness' [that] deviated 
from the established procedures which ensure the 
institutional independence of the grand jury." Majority 
Opinion at 11. I agree that such a blanket rule, if it were 
imposed, would improperly place a substantive limitation 
upon the grand jury, is outside the District Court's 
supervisory powers, and has been implicitly r ejected by this 
Court in Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd., 975 F .2d 102 (3d Cir. 
1992). See Appellant's brief at 39-41. 
 
However, I disagree with the Majority's characterization of 
the District Court's holding. The District Court did not 
impose a new substantive limitation upon the grand jury. 
Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pr ocedure states 
that "[t]he court . . . may quash or modify[a] subpoena if 
compliance would be unreasonable or oppr essive." See also 
United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 299 (1991). 
The Majority recognizes Rule 17(c) as a valid"form of 
restraint" upon the grand jury, but nonetheless holds that 
the District Court failed to apply it. Majority Opinion at 10. 
I concede that the District Court never explicitly invoked 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c), but such an omission is not fatal as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. At the very least, the Majority believes that the District Court 
"impose[d] substantive limitations on the power of the grand jury [and 
placed] the initial burden on the gover nment to prove the validity of its 
subpoenas." Majority Opinion at 10. 
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long as what the court did is clear.2 Furthermore, we "may 
affirm the District Court on any grounds supported by the 
record." Nicini v. Morra, 212 F .3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
The District Court in his case considered the specific 
facts and circumstances before it and found that it was 
"fundamentally unfair for the U.S. Attorney's Office to seek 
[the attorney's] testimony."3 Rule 17(c) empowers a court to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. See United States v. Baird, 109 F.3d 856, 862 (3d Cir. 1997) 
("Although the court did not explicitly state that it was denying the 
motion, nor did it state the reasons for doing so, it is clear from the 
record that the court carefully considered Baird's cooperation within the 
S 5K1.1 frame of reference.");Fellheimer, Eichen & Braverman, P.C. v. 
Charter Techs. Inc., 57 F.3d 1215, 1228-29 (3d Cir. 1995) ("While it is 
true that the bankruptcy court did not indicate that it was acting 
pursuant to S 328(c), . . . we find that the denial of FE & B's fees 
application may be upheld as an exercise of the bankruptcy court's 
authority under S 328(c)."); United States v. Sallins, 993 F.2d 344, 346 
n.2 (3d Cir. 1993) ("[T]he district court did not state its reason for 
admitting the evidence. [However], we will assume that the district court 
believed the evidence was admissible as backgr ound."); United States v. 
Thomas, 961 F.2d 1110, 1120 (3d Cir . 1992) ("Although the district court 
did not explicitly state in its written judgment that the foregone fifteen 
year sentence was a basis for the upward departure, we believe Thomas' 
firearm possession played a major, if not predominant, role in the court's 
sentencing decision."); Inmates of the Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 901 
F.2d 1191, 1198 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Although the district court did not state 
whether it intended its July 17, 1989 order to be a civil contempt 
sanction, it is clear from the circumstances that the order is most 
properly characterized as a coercive civil contempt order entered in a 
post-permanent injunction proceeding."); Myertech Corp. v. Myertech 
Corp., 831 F.2d 410, 419 (3d Cir. 1987) ("The bankruptcy judge did not 
explicitly state under which paragraph of S 2715 he fashioned his 
remedy; however, we can presume that his calculation was rendered 
under 2715(b)."); Chirinos de Alvarez v. Creole Petroleum Corp, 613 F.2d 
1240, 1244 (3d Cir. 1980) ("Although the court did not clearly state so, 
it is apparent from a review of its decision that the dismissal was based 
primarily on the ground that the plaintif fs had not stated a ground upon 
which relief could be granted.") 
3. The court cited numerous avenues that the Government could have 
pursued to obtain the same information, "which are far less offensive 
[than] seeking to pierce the attor ney-client privilege." These included 
subpoenas that the U.S. Attorney's Office choose not to enforce and the 
Government's failure to insist that a custodian of records confirm the 
attorney's assertions. The court also noted that compelling his testimony 
could "unnecessarily `drive a wedge' between a client and his attorney, 
thereby `chilling' communications." 
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quash a subpoena if it is "unreasonable or oppressive." 
Presumably, the Majority believes that a finding of 
"fundamental unfairness" is insufficient to satisfy this 
standard. In contrast, I fail to see a dif ference. A subpoena 
described as "fundamentally unfair" could just as easily be 
described as "unreasonable and oppressive." Therefore, I 
believe that the District Court sufficiently invoked the 
authority of Rule 17(c). Unlike the Majority, I would not 
reverse based entirely upon an unimportant semantic 
distinction.4 
 
Assuming the District Court did act under Rule 17(c), we 
review its decision to quash a grand jury subpoena solely 
for abuse of discretion. We must "uphold the district court's 
decision `unless it is clearly arbitrary or without support in 
the record.' " United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 191 (3rd 
Cir. 1998).5 There is nothing in the record to suggest that 
the District Court's decision to quash the Gover nment's 
subpoena under these specific facts constituted an abuse of 
discretion. The court was concerned that enforcing the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. It is beyond dispute that "unfair," "unreasonable," and "oppressive" 
are 
often used synonymously. A Westlaw sear ched revealed 1710 federal 
decisions, 40 of which were Supreme Court decisions, where "unfair" 
appeared within five words of "unreasonable" or "oppressive." See e.g. 
Bush v. Gore, 121 S.Ct. 525, 546 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
("Refusing to supplant Illinois law with a federal definition of waiver, 
we 
explained that the state court's declaration `should bind us unless so 
unfair or unreasonable in its application to those asserting a federal 
right as to obstruct it.' "); Asahi Metal Co. Ltd. v. Superior Court of 
California, 480 U.S. 102, 116, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 1034 (1987) (O'Connor, 
J., concurring) ("[T]he exercise of personal jurisdiction by a California 
court over Asahi in this instance would be unr easonable and unfair."); 
Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1234-35 (3d Cir. 1992) ("We believe 
that factors such as the nature of the pr ocess by which jury lists are 
composed, the length of time of underrepr esentation, and the strength of 
the evidence that purports to establish an `unfair and unreasonable' 
representation should be examined under Duren."). 
 
5. See also In re Grand Jury Subpoena , 138 F.3d 442, 444 (1st Cir. 
1998); United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1499 (9th Cir. 1996); In re 
Grand Jury Matters, 751 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1984) ("We review a district 
court decision to quash, or not quash, a grand jury subpoena, solely for 
abuse of discretion, with much deference being owed to the lower court's 
authority."). 
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Government's subpoena would put attorneys in a "very 
precarious position," subjecting them to grand jury 
subpoena any time they made representations pertaining to 
the existence of subpoenaed records. See App. at 172-73 ("I 
guess the lawyer can't say a word to the U.S. Attorney's 
office about those things because he'd be subject to coming 
in to testify as to what his course of knowledge is."). 
 
This threat would certainly chill communication between 
attorney and client. Both the government and the Majority 
seem to believe, however, that the attor ney-client privilege 
is the only means by which a district court can protect that 
relationship. See Majority Opinion at 11 ("[T]he proper 
course under Fed. R. Crim P. 17(c) was to rule on whether 
the lawyer's testimony was protected under the attorney- 
client privilege."); Appellant's brief at 13-14 ("The only 
proper substantive limitation on the grand jury's ability to 
compel [the attorney's] testimony is the attorney-client 
privilege."). I do not read a district court's discretion so 
narrowly. American jurisprudence has long r ecognized the 
central importance of the attorney-client r elationship. The 
privilege is the most common means of protecting the 
relationship, but it is not the only one. In appropriate 
factual situations, such as the present case, a district court 
can, within its discretion, conclude that a subpoena is 
unreasonable and oppressive because it har ms the 
attorney-client relationship, even if the privilege does not 
apply. 
 
A constant threat of subpoena would also af fect the 
ability of lawyers to cooperate with the gover nment. The 
Government contends that "[t]he duty to safeguard `the 
healthy relationship between the criminal defense bar and 
the U.S. Attorney's Office' lies squar ely with the parties to 
that relationship itself, not the district court." Appellant's 
brief at 52. It appears that the Government 
misunderstands the court's concern. If a court were to 
enforce a grand jury subpoena against an attor ney in a 
case such as this, where there wer e numerous alternative 
avenues of gathering the desired information, it would 
impose the threat of subpoena over all r epresentations 
made by counsel. It does not escape my attention that this 
would grant the U.S. Attorney's Office tr emendous leverage 
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-- so much in fact that any competent counsel would 
produce a custodian rather than respond to inquires. See 
App. at 171-75. This would severely hamper the efficient 
administration of justice, a matter of paramount concern to 
this Court. 
 
These consequences might be acceptable (and 
reasonable) if the Government had no other means of 
obtaining the desired information. In this case, however, 
the U.S. Attorney's Office repeatedly served subpoenas that 
were never enforced, and it failed to insist upon 
authentication from a custodian of recor ds. As a result, the 
District Court found that the burden upon the attorney was 
unreasonable, and I cannot disagree. 
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